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The Same the Whole World Over? A Review Essay on Youth Offending From the 1980s 
and Youth Justice in Contemporary China 
1. Introduction 
The rapid development of the Chinese economy over the past three decades has brought with 
it what appears to be an increase in crime (Zhang, 2008). The upsurge of youth offending in 
particular is thought by some social scientists to be a consequence of rapid shifts in the 
economic system and its social conditions (Curran and Cook, 1993; Bakken, 1993). This 
seems to add weight to the claim made by Durkheimians, Left Realists and some Critical 
Criminologists that these economic shifts, combined with widening social inequality, can 
disrupt fragile socio-cultural systems and produce the conditions for increases in crime, 
especially the types associated with youth disaffection and migration into criminal markets 
(Winlow, 2001; Lea, 2002; Reiner, 2007; Currie, 2010).   
Our discussion starts from 1980 for two major reasons. First, we are investigating youth 
crime and youth justice from a comparative perspective that compares China and the West. 
China joined the Western-dominated capitalist world when Deng Xiaoping initiated the 
‘opening up’ policy in 1978. Whilst benefiting from capitalism’s ability to boost economic 
growth, China has also inherited the system’s social problems. The second reason concerns 
the ‘data problem’ that impedes research on crime in China. Official crime data were largely 
unavailable until the 1980s. Since then, although official statistics are released from time to 
time, they are unsystematic, incomplete (Jiang, 2014; Zhang, Messner & Liu, 2007) and 
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‘questionable’ (He, 2014: 147) in terms of accuracy, consistency and reliability (Curran, 
2014). Official statistics are not disaggregated by gender, age and specific crime types (Shen 
& Winlow, 2013), therefore they cannot be relied on to represent or predict with any rigour 
trends and patterns of youth offending. 
 However, in the past few decades there have been some positive developments. 
‘Investigator-initiated’ criminological research has enabled a rich seam of unofficial crime 
data to be mined. Efforts made by western researchers – overseas Chinese scholars in 
particular – have improved the construction of crime statistics to the extent that they will be 
more useful for future studies (He, 2014; Zhang, 2014). This method has indeed provided a 
useful alternative to official crime statistics (Pyrooz and Decker, 2013). There is now a body 
of literature presenting the data-sets collected by these researchers. Such data have enabled 
scholars to reach a cautious conclusion that over the past 15 years youth delinquency has 
been rising along with China’s modernisation (Zhang, 2008). This claim will be further 
clarified in this article by using a more recent data set.  
 Furthermore, consulting open sources to gain information from published materials, 
such as academic publications in the Chinese language, news reports and official 
documentation available in public domain has helped to enhance this method of studying 
crime-related matters in China (see for example Shen, Antonopoulos & von Lampe, 2010; 
Davies and Shen, 2010; Shen, Antonopoulos & Papanicolaou, 2013). However, caution must 
be exercised because the figures cited from open sources are sometimes overlapped, 
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inconsistent and vaguely defined in their original sources (Shen and Winlow, 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, we have found that the statistics indicating youth offending in the same 
period are frequently inconsistent, largely because they were collected by different agencies 
for various purposes, a similar situation to that which made US crime statistics in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unreliable (see Hall and McLean, 2009). Youth 
crime trends are indicated by the numbers of offences recorded by the police, arrest and clear 
up rates, or the numbers of administrative sanctions, prosecutions, convictions or 
imprisonments. Methodological problems are not unique to China. Estimating levels and 
rates of crime is difficult for all jurisdictions, largely because of myriad well-known problems 
relating to official statistics. However, the data problem does not prevent western social 
scientists from paying attention to post-1980 youth crime in China and the official responses 
to it. This is because contemporary China, with its geographic vastness, cultural diversity and 
complex changes caused by the economic transition, offers exciting opportunities for 
researchers (Liu, 2009).  
Whilst many scholars have made useful contributions to the issue and some existing 
review essays discuss these contributions (for example Zhang, 2008), the field requires 
revision and further analysis. This article differs from previous review essays for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it does not aim to summarise the major findings of previous studies. Nor 
does it simply aim to expose the limitations of earlier studies and suggest future research (see 
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Zhang, 2008). Rather, it is comparative in nature, and compares the trends of youth crime and 
youth justice with those in the West. Relying on published materials in both English and 
Chinese, it considers trends in different cultural, political and economic settings.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the patterns observed previously may no longer apply 
fully to the current situation, especially in the regions most affected by reforms (Zhang et al, 
1996). As a consequence of these reforms and the further incorporation of neoliberal 
economics into the social structure in China, the traditional collective structure has been 
significantly weakened, if not totally disintegrated. The danwei system, for example, which 
once helped to reduce the risk of young people becoming official offenders (Zhang and 
Messner, 1999; Zhang, 2008), no longer plays a significant role in Chinese society (Ren, 
2013). It is therefore reasonable to expect that youth offending and youth justice have been 
reshaped by such radical administrative changes. For example, it was observed nearly twenty 
years ago that gang crime was not a serious problem (Zhang et al, 1997), whilst recent 
literature tells a different story (see for example Yao, 2012; Pyrooz and Decker, 2013). We 
will return to this later. Simultaneously, however, following developments in global 
restorative justice movements in recent years, new restorative measures have been created 
primarily for juvenile offenders (see Shen and Antonopoulos, 2013). Thus, in the midst of 
these rapid, complex and confusing changes, our existing knowledge needs periodic updating 
and expansion to better inform our analyses. This study seeks to draw upon updated 
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knowledge to analyse the current circumstances in youth offending in China and how the 
nation is responding to the problem in ways that both ensure the stable continuation of 
economic growth and comply with the globalising principle of ‘child friendly juvenile justice’ 
(see Goldson and Muncie, 2011).  
Previous studies seem to have emphasised the uniqueness of youth offending as a 
product of China’s distinctive socio-cultural and political history (Liu, 1984; Wok, 1990; 
Curran and Cook, 1993; Bakken, 1993). Drawing from the culturalist and pluralist theoretical 
frameworks that have been influential in Western social science (see Hall, 2012), Chinese 
youth crime and justice tend to be seen as distinct from Western models (Wong, 2001; 2004). 
However, underneath the obvious differences, many important similarities appear to have 
been overlooked.  
This article attempts to throw some light on the contentious issues outlined above and 
fill a void in the literature by providing an easily digested review of what we now know about 
youth offending patterns and youth justice in China and how they compare to the West. It 
begins with a brief discussion of definitional issues, and then outlines recent patterns of youth 
crime in China before proceeding to explore the philosophical basis of Chinese youth justice 
and recent developments in policy and practice. Finally, it concludes that patterns of youth 
offending in China are beginning to converge with those of the industrialised West despite 
China’s unique and diverse cultural landscape. Indeed, criminal justice systems in most 
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nations now face similar challenges (Pakes, 2004). Although the adult criminal justice system 
in China retains many of its traditional punitive principles and practices and differs quite 
significantly from those typically found in the West (Liu and Palermo, 2009), youth justice in 
China is an exception. It shares many characteristics with Western systems and operates on 
similar core principles based on social reintegration. However, it must be said that while the 
principles of Chinese youth justice do not differ substantially from those of the West, some 
systems and practices differ among various internal jurisdictions, as they do amongst Western 
nations and regions (Doob and Tonry, 2004), and in some cases may fall below the standards 
required to uphold core principles.  
We will now examine some definitional issues before entering the main discussion on 
youth offending and youth justice in contemporary China. Definitions of ‘youth’ vary in 
China according to cultural contexts, but since the inception of the People’s Republic, the 
justice and welfare systems have tried to draw on categories and values that are shared across 
the whole nation. The legal term wei-cheng-nian-ren (non-adults) is enshrined in the Law on 
the Protection of Minors 1991 (LPM 1991), referring to juveniles from 14 up to 18 years old. 
The same definition is used in the Law on Prevention of Juvenile Offending 1999 (LPJO 
1999). It is also used in a series of guidelines issued to the judiciary, for example, the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Several Rules on Criminal Trials Involving wei-cheng-nian-
ren 2000 (thereafter ‘SPC Rules 2000’) and the SPC Interpretations to Several Issues in 
Regard to the Application of Law to Deal with Criminal Trials Involving wei-cheng-nian-ren 
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2006 (thereafter ‘SPC Interpretations 2006’). The juvenile court is called shao-nian-fa-ting to 
emphasise the young ages of those subject to its rulings.  
Chinese literature and official documents also draw upon the common culturo-legal 
term qing-shao-nian, and the term ‘qing-shao-nian crime’ therefore refers to crime 
committed by wei-cheng-nian-ren together with youths of 18-25 years old. Curran and Cook 
(1993) conclude that overall the Chinese juvenile justice system has jurisdiction over all 
youth offenders up to the age of 25, which means, for non-capital offences, relative leniency 
in sentencing and the availability of support services for a significantly longer period in the 
life-course compared to most Western countries. 
The broad term qing-shao-nian-wei-fa-fan-zui is preferred in the context of youth 
justice in China. This indicates that youth offending should include both delinquency (wei-fa) 
and crime (fan-zui) (Wang, 2006). Delinquency is explicitly defined in LPJO 1999, in which 
the organicist metaphors ‘unhealthy behaviour’ and ‘very unhealthy behaviour’ reflect the 
meanings and sentiments that prevail in popular culture. Although legally defining deviance 
may incur some contestation in culture and theoretical difficulties in legal and academic 
circles, Chinese culture and law together adopt a pragmatic approach governed by the 
principle that a consensual view of deviance helps to solve problems in practice – an 
approach that prioritises problem-solving above both retribution and deterrence.  
2. Juvenile Offending in China from the 1980s 
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Before we investigate patterns of offending, it is worth repeating that the official statistics 
and academic estimates cited below are vaguely defined in their original sources. They are far 
from accurate and must be read with a high degree of caution. However, the unreliability of 
statistics is a common problem for criminologists in all environments where more revealing 
qualitative research has not been conducted. Until qualitative work commences on a wide 
scale, we have little choice but to use available data in a comparative mode to construct initial 
heuristic conceptions of rough movements in temporal and spatial patterns (see Hall, 2012). 
Whilst some observe that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had very low crime 
rates in its early days (Dutton, 1997; Zhang et al, 2009), Dixon (1981) argues that juvenile 
offending has always to some extent been a source of concern to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Existing literature analysing patterns of youth offending in the PRC from its 
establishment in 1949 through to the 1990s (see Mok, 1990; Dixon, 1981; Bakken, 1993; 
Zhang, 2002) suggests that it had a distinct characters in each of its phases: the new PRC 
phase (1949 - 1965); the Cultural Revolution phase (1966 - 1976); the post-Cultural 
Revolution phase (1976 - 1979); and the economic reform and development phase (1980 - 
present day). Accepting with caution the basic claims made in the past research, this study 
will focus on the final phase in which youth crime seems to display a broad trend similar to 
trends in youth crime in Western nations.  
From the late 1970s politically-managed reform radically changed the economic 
landscape in China. Although it increased investment, production and export-driven wealth it 
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also widened and hardened social inequality (Peerenboom, 2008). Rates of youth offending 
began rising year by year (Zhang, 2002). In 1978-80 it accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of 
overall crime (Liu, 1984). It dropped slightly and stabilised at 70 per cent in the eighties 
(Yang and Zhong, 2007) only to be followed by a dramatic upsurge in the 1990s (Curran and 
Cook, 1993; Bakken, 1993). It has returned to around 70 per cent in recent years (Legal Daily, 
2013). 
Data from Bai’s (2010) study of police statistics in the period from 1988 to 2007 
suggest a clear rise in the overall offending rate: in 1988 the rate per 100,000 of the 
population was 75.5, while by 2007 it had risen to 363.9. Although like everywhere it is 
reasonable to think that the figures may suffer from some degree of unreliability due to 
variations such as possible fluctuations in crime reporting and recording, the overall 
statistical shift is supported by other sources such as the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). 
The proportion of youths in the overall rate seems to be high. For example, Xinhua News 
(2005) quoted from the MPS: ‘in the first half of 2005, 44.75 per cent of the criminal suspects 
were young offenders at ages 10-25’. Interestingly, interim statistics seemed to suggest that in 
this period the youth offending rate had stopped rising and had gradually become more stable. 
Ju (2007) explains that this may reflect changes in the arrest criteria implemented by the MPS 
in 1992. As a consequence fewer criminal cases were recorded. Similarly, the new criminal 
law of 1997, which decriminalised a number of acts, may have also reduced the youth 
offending statistics.  
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Yao (2011), based on an analysis of the numbers of youth offenders tried in the courts 
in the period 1990 – 2009, offers a rough trend given that it does not take into account growth 
in the adult and youth populations in the same period. It shows that, despite fluctuations and 
the changes in law and recording practices, the overall youth crime rate has been increasing 
in the last ten years or so, and the number of crime involving wei-cheng-nian offenders has 
been persistently rising. Ju (2007) indicates also that young offenders now tend to be engaged 
in criminality at an increasingly younger age.  
Thus, despite the usual data problems, sufficient evidence available in the researcher-
collected data sets suggests an upward trend in the rate of youth offending from the early 
1990s to the present day. This is simply too significant to ignore. The literature also suggests 
that a combination of factors can be attributed to this upward trend from the beginning of the 
1980s. The mainstream theory coming from the more critical positivist and realist 
perspectives tends to link youth offending to socioeconomic disruption, widening social 
inequality and other consequences of modernisation such as expanding opportunities and 
youth disaffection (see Bai, 2010; Cao, 2007; Liu, 1984; Bakken, 1993; Li, 2011). This is 
very similar to the basic contextual causes of youth crime identified in some studies of crime 
in Western industrial regions (see Taylor, 1999; Lea, 2002; Currie, 2010). Theoretical 
approaches based in shifting socioeconomic conditions are often unfairly criticised as 
‘reductionist’, but on closer inspection most contemporary theories grounded in the 
socioeconomic context are sensitive to cultural mediation and local variations (see Reiner, 
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2007). It would possibly be fairer to criticise cultural theories that pay too little attention to 
underlying economic conditions as cultural reductionism (see Hall, 2012).  
Seeking further clarification of the issue, a set of studies was carried out by western 
researchers in China to test existing theories. The results are also largely consistent with the 
general findings in the mainstream western literature on the aetiology of youth crime and 
delinquency. For example, in a birth cohort study, Friday and colleagues (2003) claimed that 
their findings supported the ‘general theory of crime’ as proposed by Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990). Research carried out by Lening Zhang and Steven Messner addressed a variety of 
correlations of involvement in delinquency in China by applying social control theory and 
labelling theory (see Zhang, 2014). The findings of Bao and colleagues in China (2007) 
provided support for the application of the general strain theory. Recently, in the research on 
gang involvement and delinquency, the findings in China (see Friday et al, 2005; Pyrooz and 
Decker, 2013) consistently parallel those from the USA and Europe, and support the Western 
theory of peer group pressure. They conclude that at the individual level the positive 
statistical relationship between gang involvement and delinquency is invariant despite the 
geographic, cultural, and political differences across regional contexts (Pyrooz and Decker, 
2013). Overall, the results of these studies suggest that a number of established 
criminological theories constructed in Western contexts can be applied to empirical data 
currently being gathered in China. In addition, cross-cultural studies have enabled researchers 
to discover replicable risk and protective factors for youth offending in different cultural 
12 
 
contexts (Farrington and Loeber, 1999; Friday and Hage, 1976; Kamon, Harada and 
Yonezato, 2002), including China (Friday et al, 2003; 2005). A number of studies confirm 
that, like in the West, the quality of family relations is associated with youth offending in 
China, as are young people’s attachments to school and the quality of educational provision 
in the school (Friday et al, 2003; 2005; Wang et al, 2002; Zhang and Messner, 1995). 
Parental expectations, especially those of fathers, are also associated with youth offending in 
China (Friday et al, 2005). Following the global trend, recent literature draws attention to the 
impact of the internet and computer games in China (see for example Bax 2013). According 
to a Zhejiang survey, 48.8 per cent of young suspects were frequent visitors to internet cafés 
prior to their arrests (Yang and Zhong, 2007). Shang (2012) reports that internet-related 
crime is increasing by 30 per cent each year, mirroring a similar rise in the West (see Wall, 
2001). The striking finding in a study conducted by Greenberger et al (2001), which 
compares juvenile misconduct in three different cultures including China and the USA, 
suggests that living in settings with closer links to the global economy is associated with lax 
conduct and the perception of more lenient attitudes toward adolescent misbehaviour. Thus, 
alongside globalisation and its homogenisation of socioeconomic conditions we expect to 
find more similarities in youth crime and crime in general across ostensibly different cultural 
settings (Palidda, 2013). 
Earlier studies on youth offending conducted in China (see for example Ren, 1997; 
Wang et al, 2002) suggest that the dynamics and cohesion of families in China are different 
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from those in the West. It was argued that as a conventional institution family plays a 
significant role in the prevention of youth delinquency in China. However, conventional 
institutions are under strain in the wake of rapid socioeconomic changes (Merton, 1938; 
Reiner, 2007). For example, Zhang and Messner (1995) argued that in the 1980s and the 
1990s, ‘friend deviance’ was not associated with the official status of youth delinquency in 
China to the extent that it is in the USA. However, in a subsequent study Greenberger et al 
(2001) found that in rapidly changing societies school peers now have an independent effect 
on misconduct among Chinese youths because, as the influence of the family wanes, peer 
influences become stronger. The intrusion of mass-mediated consumer culture in family 
relations also diminishes the relative influence of parents and strengthens that of peers (Hall 
et al., 2008). 
Similarly, it was found previously that the coherence of the community and the force of 
social pressure towards the collective good were correlated with lower rates of youth crime in 
China (see for example Ren, 1997). However, alongside dramatic economic reforms, social 
norms have changed and community cohesion is weaker following large scale urbanisation 
(Reiner, 2007). Overall, neoliberalism has set the conditions for fundamental changes in 
interactions between social institutions and individuals and among individuals themselves. As 
a result, China is now becoming a ‘stranger society’ (Xu, 2013: 209) – an oriental version of 
the ‘empty world’ in the post-industrial West where what was once ‘the social’ is excluded 
from many of the spaces in which people interact (Winlow and Hall, 2013). It is therefore 
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reasonable to assume that, regarding the social conditions that underpin youth crime, the 
cultural gaps between China and western societies are narrowing down significantly.  
Admittedly, in the context of China, some localised and perhaps less convincing 
theories have also been aired in academic and political circles. For example, it has been 
argued that the rising number of youth offenders is also associated with a ‘baby boom’ during 
the Cultural Revolution. The expanded youth population correlates with youth crime (Bakken, 
1993; Ju, 2007). Curran and Cook (1993) attribute the increasing level of youth offending to 
the impact of the one-child family policy and the weakened family discipline in one-child 
families. However, this argument tends to ignore the underlying context of widening 
socioeconomic inequality and the disruption of culture and social systems caused by the 
urbanisation and industrialisation processes, all of which place significant strain on the family 
unit (Currie, 1997). Some Chinese officials, taking an overtly ideological and ethnocentric 
view, see the rapid growth of youth offending as the result of bad cultural influences from the 
outside world (Liu, 1984), with emphasis placed on the corrupting impact of Western 
bourgeois ideology (Bakken, 1993) and rotten feudalist, capitalist and other non-Marxist 
forms (Yang and Zhong, 2007). However, if we consult more sophisticated academic 
research that attempts to dig underneath simplistic theories and the official line we can see 
that the primary contexts and possible causes of youth offending identified in China do not 
seem to be too different from those often put forward by academics in the West. Nevertheless, 
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current youth offending in China presents criminologists with complex details that require 
further analysis.  
Firstly, long-term trends show that both property crimes and offences against the person 
are commonplace but, as in the West (see Roe and Ashe, 2008), the former category had been 
traditionally predominant. Wang (2006) reported that larceny normally accounted for 80 per 
cent of juvenile delinquency. However, in the first half of 2005, 75.8 per cent of the offenders 
in the age-range 10-25 were arrested for robbery (Xinhua News, 2005). The MPS statistics 
show that in 2008, 85.1 per cent of the young offenders aged 16-17 and 95 per cent of those 
aged 15-16 were convicted for theft, robbery, mugging and assault (Chen 2012). This 
indicates that in the past few years youth offending has shifted to more serious violent 
offences, in which murder, armed robbery, serious assault, rape and use of explosive devices 
are major components (Huang, 2012). This mirrors a trend towards versatility and violence, 
which has been experienced in England and Wales from the 1980s onwards (Winlow, 2001; 
Soothill et al, 2008; Hall, 2012). Increasing media representation of violence is often thought 
to have a direct influence (Huang, 2012), but this has largely been disproven by research in 
the West: the media tend to reflect – albeit in a distorted manner – rather than cause changes 
in cultural values, norms and behaviours (see Carrabine, 2008).  
Secondly, more young people now commit crime at an increasingly younger age. Yang 
and Zhong (2007) discovered that since the 1990s the average age of first offending has 
become two to four years earlier than it was the 1970s. The China Youth Offending Research 
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Institute reports that more than 70 per cent of offences are now committed by juveniles aged 
14-16. More young people under age 14 are taking their first steps in offending (Huang, 2012; 
Ju, 2007), and even those aged 10-13 were found to be committing crimes at a notably 
increased rate (Huang, 2012). Despite this new trend, the findings of Friday et al (2005) 
suggest that 37.7 per cent of the offending population commenced their criminal behaviour 
after age 18. This is consistent with findings in western contexts (see Sampson & Laub, 1993; 
Tracy, Wolfgang and Figlio, 1990). Also, comparative literature (see for example Friday, Ren 
and Weitekamp, 2003) indicates similarities between China and the West in research on the 
criminal careers, which fits with the general claims of developmental and life-course 
criminology (Farrington, 2002), although the western concept of a ‘chronic offender’ 
(Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin 1972; Weitekamp et al, 1996) did not seem to be applicable in 
China (see Friday et al, 2003), where very few repeated young offenders have been identified. 
Updated research on this aspect of criminal career development is required to find out 
whether it is still a discernable trend.  
Thirdly, youth offending is becoming more organised. The number of ‘joint ventures’ 
has increased, the number of associates has expanded and the internal organisation has been 
enhanced. Yao (2012) claims that, now 70 per cent of the total for the age-range, gang-related 
crime has increased as a proportion of overall youth crime. This echoes Pitts’s (2008) 
observation of increasing gang crime in London. In the western contexts, a rich body of 
literature on peer influence and youth gangs (for example, Carrington, 2009; Decker and 
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Pyrooz, 2010; 2013; von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; Hallsworth, 2013) suggests the 
tendencies of youth to co-offend. Worldwide, it is argued that gangs are a key factor in the 
fields of violence and victimisation (see Decker and Pyrooz, 2010), while in China a survey 
carried out in Shangdong in 2004 shows that 53.42 per cent of the total of 1,600 juvenile 
offenders committed offences in groups of three to seven or more. Similarly, a Yunnan 
survey revealed that 66.3 per cent of juvenile offending was gang-related (Yao, 2012). Webb, 
et al (2011) used a virtually identical survey instrument in both China and the USA in order 
to compare youth gangs and related behaviours. They find that Chinese youth gang members 
were less likely to be associated with violent crimes and drug related offences. However, 
Pyrooz and Decker (2013) argue that self-reported rates of delinquency and gang 
involvement were not unlike Western countries, and their findings on the relationship 
between gangs and delinquency, particularly violence, are consistent with the existing 
western literature. Local Chinese scholars, for example Yao (2012), claim that juvenile gangs, 
driven by material gain and status seeking, have enlarged in average size and increased in 
effectiveness. Therefore, mindful of the grey figure of unrecorded crime, we should not 
underestimate the harms caused by organised young offenders. 
Fourthly, like adult offending, youth offending seems to have become more 
technologically sophisticated and ‘professional’ (Yu, 2012; Xinhua News, 2005), again 
following trends in Britain and the USA (see Wall, 2001; Yar, 2006). Youth crime often 
involves careful planning, co-ordination and use of advanced counter-detection measures. 
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Modern technology now plays a role in financial fraud, gambling, rape and robbery involving 
youths (Yang and Zhong, 2007).  
Female youth offending is also rising steeply (Wang, 2006). Economic gain in a society 
with widening socioeconomic divisions, increasing opportunities, declining social cohesion 
and rapidly shifting norms might be the most common reason (Yan, 2009; Zheng, 2013). 
Female youth offenders in China, a category that includes schoolgirls, are seen to be engaged 
in various offences, including drug taking and prostitution (Long, 2010; Yang and Zhong, 
2007). This follows the trend in the West, for example Britain and the USA, the most overtly 
neoliberal nations (see for example Chesney-Lind, 1993; Joe-Laider and Hunt 2001; Sharpe, 
2012; Wallworth, 2013). There are also similarities in gender disproportionality in both China 
and the West (see Friday et al, 2003). As a result, as in the West (see Heidensohn, 1996), 
female offending in China has historically been underrepresented (Wang, 2002). Further 
research is required to look closely into the criminality of girls and young women and their 
experiences in the criminal justice process.   
Overall, youth offending in China does seem to display some broad trends, 
characteristics and underlying contexts largely similar to those of youth crime in the West, 
while it retains others that are unique to the Chinese cultural and legal settings. For example, 
although it has recently been increasing (see Legal Daily, 2013), drug-related crime is still 
comparatively under-represented in the overall picture of Chinese youth crime (Friday et al, 
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2003). This may be partly attributed to the intensive drug control policy – a legacy of the 
reaction to what Chinese culture and government regarded as serious physical, cultural and 
socioeconomic harms caused by large-scale drug distribution in the nineteenth century – 
under which the death penalty is still an available option. On the other hand, the increase in 
drug-related crime suggests that deterrence is gradually becoming less effective than it once 
might have been. However, existing literature does suggest that, like in the West, drug users 
in China tend to be young male and female adults, poorly educated, either employed or self-
employed (Gui, 2005; Kurlantzick, 2002; Liang, 2014). Also, the statistics suggest that the 
number of young offenders involved in robberies in China is proportionately higher than in 
the Western jurisdictions, such as, for instrance, England and Wales (see Roe and Ashe, 
2008), but that may well be down to differences in legal definitions (Peerenboom, 2008), an 
issue that again requires further comparative research. However, evidence in existing 
literature does indicate indisputably that the primary underlying socioeconomic and cultural 
conditions associated with crime elsewhere are also evident in China.  
3. The Chinese Youth Justice Model: Tradition, Policy and Practical Developments 
Is China’s youth justice system substantially different in principle and practice from those in 
the West? Our analysis begins with traditional Chinese philosophy.  
In China, Confucianism and Legalism are the major traditional philosophies 
underpinning the legal system (Lee and Lai, 1977-1978). On one side, China’s criminal 
20 
 
justice policy is deeply rooted in Confucian philosophy (Wong, 2004), which emphasises 
secular government and human agency guided by moral rules (li), and li should be brought 
about by education (Dikotter, 2002). In Confucianism’s li, humanitarianism is recognised as 
an important element (Bodde, 1973). On the other side, Legalism promotes legal rules (fa), 
using formal systems and sanctions to enforce compliance with the law (Chen, 2011).  
Confucian acknowledgement of the inequality of people, human particularism and 
humanitarianism justified special legal provisions concerning weaker members of society, 
such as the young, who are guilty of crime. The Opening Chapter of Li Ji, for example, states 
that ‘[a] person of seven is called a child deserving of pity. Children deserving of pity are not 
to be subjected to punishment, even though they may have committed a crime’ (Bodde, 1973: 
441). Legalism, in contrast, does not in principle differentiate rules according to varying 
social positions, circumstances, age-ranges and degrees of vulnerability. A hypothetical pure 
Legalism would insist on complete equality before fa and the enforcement of objective and 
unvarying rules of conduct (Lee and Lai, 1977-1978).  
Confucianism and Legalism merged during the period of the Han Dynasty between B.C. 
202 and A.D. 9 (Liu and Palermo, 2009). Confucianism’s successors recognise the 
combination of education and criminal sanctions. Xun Zi, for example, argued that 
‘[s]anction without education would result in the frequent use of sanction but failure to 
eliminate evils; education without sanction would allow bad people to go unpunished’ 
(Encyclopedia of Chinese Culture, 2013). The Legalists also made concessions and sought to 
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interpret Confucianism from their own perspective. For example, Dong Zhongshu promoted 
the principle that the political and legal policy should emphasise virtue (de) as primary and 
criminal sanctions (xin) as secondary (Zhou, 2012). Over time the result has been that 
Legalism now accepts Confucian li and humanitarianism when enforcing xin. Such fusion is 
reflected in China’s criminal justice policy today. The utilitarian goals of punishment and the 
humanitarian principles of education and social inclusion are both appreciated in the 
development of the modern criminal justice system (Chen, 2011), with the balance now 
shifted towards li  (Liu and Palermo, 2009).  
The human rights abuses of which China is often accused by Western governments 
(Brahm, 1996) loomed large during the Cultural Revolution prior to the period of reform. 
However, such abuse is not formally endorsed by culture, government or the principles of the 
youth justice system. The legal reform over the past 25 years that seeks to bring China closer 
to the international community is unique, and ‘no other region has made such progress in 
such a short period of time’ (Max Planck Research, 2008: 40).  
LPM 1991 and LPJO 1999 are the major pieces of legislation addressing both juvenile 
protection and the prevention of youth offending. LPM makes it clear that the State should 
prioritise the protection and nurturance of juveniles. It emphasises the principle that, 
depending on the crime, the offender and their specific circumstances, wei-cheng-nian-ren 
should be given mitigated or reduced sentences, or be exempted from criminal sanctions 
altogether in accordance with the law. LPJO goes further to ensure the education of juveniles, 
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prevention of juvenile offending and reduction of recidivism. Both statutes specify the 
general principles that should apply in all responses to juvenile offending: ‘education is 
primary; punishment is secondary’ and ‘combining education, ganhu and rescue’ (Section 54 
of LPM 1991; Section 44 of LPJO, 1999). Based on a Mencian view of human nature, the 
notion of ganhua further affirms the belief that even criminals can achieve self-improvement 
through proper institutional guidance (Dikotter, 2002). These principles form the fundamental 
basis of the Chinese youth justice policy, and are consistently emphasised in all legal 
documentation regarding treatment of juvenile offenders, for example, Article 2, the MPS 
Notice on Dealing with Criminal Cases Involving wei-cheng-niai-ren 1995 (thereafter ‘MPS 
Notice 1995’); Article 3, SPC Rules 2000; Introduction, SPC Interpretations 2006; Article 2, 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) Rules on Dealing with Criminal Cases Involving 
wei-cheng-niai-ren 2007 (thereafter ‘SPP Rules 2007’). Thus, the overriding principle in 
Chinese law is that the legal system should offer leniency in order to give young offenders a 
chance to turn over a new leaf and contribute to national development (Mok, 1990).  
While empowering policy to shape the formal structure of the law, the CCP also 
represents traditional moral values, in a way similar to Durkheim’s description of the 
development of Western law (Ziegert, 1980). Taking the views of the two traditional schools 
of philosophy, the Chinese criminal justice policy combines kuan (leniency) with yan 
(rigidity), which, couched in Western terms, is essentially a complex combination of 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restoration. As demonstrated in the SPC Opinion on 
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Implementing the Criminal Justice Policy of Combining Leniency with Rigidity 2010, young 
offenders must be treated with leniency to restore their relationship to society, whilst on 
occasions in practice harsher penalties are allowed for juveniles who are involved in serious 
crimes (Wang, 2006; Bakken, 1993).  
The Chinese value the function of education in shaping individuals’ thoughts and 
behaviours (Zhang and Liu, 2007). This is taken very seriously by policymakers. For example, 
in response to the first wave of youth offending in the late 1970s, a central government 
document was distributed in 1979 to stress the use of informal measures, particularly 
educational programmes, for young offenders (Document 2000). When reacting to the second 
wave of youth offending in the 1980s, the central leadership issued a notice in October 1985, 
further emphasising the use of educational measures and the engagement of the whole society 
in the attempt to reduce crime and rehabilitate offenders. Shen and Antonopoulos (2013) 
argue that the same principles are reflected in the newly created measures for youth offenders. 
Over the years, juvenile-friendly principles have been developed in line with the basic 
Chinese philosophy of youth justice.    
The Chinese philosophy of youth justice – in contrast to the Western classical liberal 
emphasis on individual responsibility and guilt supported by individualised welfare 
programmes (see Garland, 1985) – is based on the belief that youth crime is in essence a 
social problem, and its prevention and reduction requires the participation of the whole 
society (Liu, 2011). Document 2000, for example, addresses the provision of employment 
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opportunities for youths, the prevention of youth delinquency through education, and the 
guarantee of appropriate settlements for released prisoners. Since 1990, the Comprehensive 
Treatment Strategy (zong-he-zhi-li) has required the cooperative participation of all agencies 
and the use of coordinated multiple measures in response to crime (Wang, 2006). Under 
zong-he-zhi-li, informal educational and supervisory programmes are the most important 
means. Common measures include bangjiao, study-work schools and the recently developed 
restorative justice programmes (see Liu and Palermo, 2009).  
 The term bangjiao means rehabilitation in the community – a measure similar in some 
ways to the UK’s welfare model (Smith, 2005), recognised by Braithwaite (2002) as China’s 
important contemporary restorative justice institution. Bangjiao offers various informal, 
community-based crime control programmes in partnership with state agencies – for example, 
designated officers from the local police station – and runs largely on a voluntary basis. 
Community care through bangjiao was reasonably successful (Mok, 1990), and therefore has 
been recognised as an important crime control mechanism in China (Zhang et al, 1996). 
However, in recent years, with the change of socioeconomic circumstances and a more 
mobile population, bangjiao came to be regarded as a helpful embellishment rather than an 
effective crime control measure in itself (Liu, 2011). To enhance bangjiao new initiatives 
have been launched (Liu, 2011; Yao, 2011), and in practice restorative justice programmes 




Similar to bangjiao, the study-work school is an informal crime control mechanism in 
China, but available exclusively to juveniles. It admits students aged 12 to 18 who have 
displayed ‘unhealthy behaviour’ or ‘very unhealthy behaviour’, and are deemed unable to 
continue studies at ordinary schools. The main function of study-work schools is educational. 
Curran and Cook (1993: 311) suggest that ‘the placement of juveniles in the work-study 
setting integrates the positive reinforcement of the community’, and, according to one 
Chinese commentator, ‘having one more study-work school, one more prison can be avoided’ 
(China News Agent Net Hainan Division, 2006). However, another commentator argued that, 
although not regarded as a punitive measure, study-work schools ‘actually harm their 
students by labelling them as wrongdoers’ (ibid). A combination of diminishing effectiveness 
in a context of changing social circumstances and a growing awareness of the deleterious 
effects that can follow the criminalisation of young people has influenced the decline in the 
use of this measure over recent years. Like bangjiao, study-work schools are now used for 
juvenile offenders as part of newly developed restorative justice interventions (Wang and He, 
2012), and thus regarded as a hopeful development in restorative justice (Braithwaite, 2002). 
After the Western concept of restorative justice was introduced to China in 2002 (Yao, 
2007), a number of programmes have been developed in the Chinese youth justice system. 
Some resemble processes described by Braithwaite and others – for example, Victim-
Offender Reconciliation (see Shi, 2008) – whilst others are recognised as restorative justice 
merely in China, which may well, from a Western perspective, be seen as alternatives derived 
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from China’s criminal justice tradition that only pay lip service to restorative justice 
principles. For example, Community Service Orders are used by the people’s procuratorates 
in China to divert young offenders from the formal processes (Li, 2005). Despite misgivings 
by some commentators, a clear trend towards the embedding of restorative justice principles 
at the core of the youth justice system of the country can be discerned (Shen and 
Antonopoulos, 2013).  
Apart from the education-oriented preventive measures discussed above, China, in 
keeping with other nations, does have a network of youth prisons for juvenile offenders under 
18 at the time of sentencing – the Institute of Rehabilitation for Juvenile Offenders (IRJO). 
Unlike adult prisoners, however, in IRJO inmates are regarded as ‘learners’ who are required 
to participate in political, moral and factual education, work and regular self-reflection and 
group evaluation. The primary function of IRJO is rehabilitative, but the learners are given 
various light jobs of specified types and durations. Hence, apart from a further emphasis on 
the rehabilitative function, if we use the example of youth custody in England and Wales, the 
Chinese youth prison is in principle – and, as far as we know at present, in practice – fairly 
similar to that in many Western jurisdictions.  
Emphasising similarities in youth correctional institutions between China and the West 
is not to deny that policing and punishment have been key factors in protecting the open 
reform agenda in China for the last few decades, running alongside but to some extent 
displacing traditional social welfare principles (Trevaskes, 2010). This echoes the relative 
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decline of welfarism, the rise of neo-classicism and the tense relationship between the two in 
the West in the midst of the socioeconomic rupture and ‘crime explosion’ in the 1980s (see 
Reiner, 2007; Smith, 2005). It is perhaps quite noteworthy that abrupt industrialisation and 
deindustrialisation have both produced similar effects in the spheres of crime and justice in 
two culturally distinct nations (see Hall and McLean, 2009). To justify this dualistic approach, 
alongside welfarism there is also a strong emphasis on views that reflect Western 
retributivism and classicism, i.e. the open choice facing criminals – they know what they do 
and they know what they do is wrong, so they deserve punishment (Bakken, 1993). Young 
people, in particular, are regarded as capable of being ‘put right’ through punishment once 
they have been convicted. The idea here, common across the world, is to deter future 
criminality and ‘nip crime in the bud’. Formal systems are also important in China’s overall 
youth justice framework (Wong, 2004).  
The formal process, although punitive in nature, does not undermine young offenders’ 
interests and rights. In an attempt to ensure that juvenile offenders are treated appropriately in 
the formal process, procedures are regulated by occupational guidelines that aim to prevent 
arbitrary, inconsistent practices. The MPS Notice 1995, for example, requires the police to 
establish specialised units and deploy specialised personnel to handle cases involving 
juveniles. The relevant staff must have the basic awareness of psychology, criminology, 
pedagogy and law along with a certain level of investigative experience. Use of coercive 
measures is largely restricted, and investigating officers must not interrupt the normal 
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schedule of a student suspect. The formal standard set here does not appear to be any lower 
than that in many Western jurisdictions (see Muncie and Goldson, 2006).  
Similarly, the SPP Rules 2007 indicate that procuratorates are required to exchange 
opinions with defence lawyers to jointly comply with educational requirements. The SPC 
Rules 2000 demand that juvenile court judges should take into account the defendant’s level 
of biological and mental maturity. Accurate wording must be used in documents and verbal 
exchanges so that juvenile defendants can understand clearly, and inducing, rebuking, 
sarcasm and threatening language are all prohibited. The judges may, if necessary, visit 
convicted juveniles who are exempt from custodial sentences in order to monitor their 
rehabilitation performance and advise the young offenders’ families on how best to fulfil the 
supervisory responsibilities required to create a suitable environment for eventual reform. 
These are clearly ‘juvenile friendly’ approaches, and again, the official standard is high.  
As in most countries, however, we must suspect that principles are not always perfectly 
practised. Indeed, in such a vast country it is difficult to ensure that local practitioners always 
follow formal guidelines. Although formal humanitarian considerations are well documented 
in Chinese youth justice policies (Zhou and Lin, 2001; Lu, 2011; Hu, 2011; Yu, 2012), 
evaluation is by no means comprehensive, and it is often unclear how these rules are 
implemented in everyday practice. While it has been observed that the leniency elements that 
are designed to ensure juvenile offenders’ welfare are not always reflected in practice (Zhang 
and Liu, 2007), the evidence we have to hand suggests that most practitioners attempt to 
29 
 
maintain standards (see also Zhou and Lin, 2007). Policy and law in action is the sphere 
where China is often criticised for suspected human rights abuses (Braithwaite, 2002). 
However, it is also common in Western youth justice systems to practise formal approaches 
as harshly as they are allowed even after apparent increases in youth crime have levelled out 
(Doob and Tonry, 2004). Serious comparative research could be undertaken only by, firstly, 
introducing some universal measure of harm to ground the abstract concept of human rights 
abuse (see Hall, 2012) and, secondly, developing the ability to generate reliable quantitative 
and qualitative data at the local level of practice.    
In China, reparative and restorative disposals are also available in the legal system. This 
includes admonishment, the order to sign a pledge of repentance or the order to make 
apologies or pay compensation, although these were rarely used in practice (Hu, 2012). In 
recent years Chinese scholars and practitioners have been recommending the expansion of the 
use of less punitive approaches – such as lenient sentencing, individualised sentencing, non-
custodial sentences or non-criminal restorative measures – for juveniles (see Hu, 2012; Ding 
and Liu, 2004; Yu, 2012; Ma, 2012). Indeed, between 1996 and 2000 25.2 per cent of the 
juvenile offenders received non-custodial sentences or were diverted from criminal sanctions 
(China Youth Study Centre, 2008). At the same time, it is worth noting that combining 
leniency with rigidity remains a key principle in the aspects of Chinese criminal justice policy 
that apply to young offenders. However, there is a vague boundary. Ma (2012) argues that 
youth offenders who have committed serious crimes, habitual offenders, recidivists and the 
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organisers or principal members of criminal groups must be treated more harshly to deter 
further offending. Where this boundary lies in principle and practice requires further detailed 
research. 
4. Conclusions  
This study is intended to provide readers with broad preliminary analyses of patterns and 
nature of youth offending in contemporary China and the condition of tradition, law, policy 
and practice in the Chinese youth justice system. Like any society undergoing rapid transition, 
China has experienced a surge of youth offending since the beginning of the 1980s. Despite 
the nation’s unique political, socioeconomic and cultural settings, the overall trend of youth 
offending in China is not substantially distinct from that experienced in many other countries 
as they endured the disruptive effects of urbanisation, industrialisation and deindustrialisation 
processes. In fact, as we have demonstrated in this article, in most important ways it 
resembles the trend that many Western jurisdictions have experienced and seems to be 
embedded in a similar, albeit complex, aetiological context.  
Therefore, like any society undergoing traumatic socioeconomic change, China is 
greatly concerned by the issue of youth offending. To tackle this problem, it relies chiefly on 
informal rehabilitative measures, largely through education within the community, supported 
by formal institutions and procedures to ensure enforcement and effectiveness. Lenient 
treatment is provided throughout the youth justice process as it seeks to maintain the 
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Confucian humanitarian tradition and also to comply with international humanitarian 
obligations. China’s move towards rehabilitation and restorative justice (see Liu and Palermo, 
2009) in principle distinguishes its youth justice system from the adult system. It is however 
worth noting that in China, as in the West, formal principles and rules may not always be 
practised in reality in the consistent ways that the lawmakers expect (Davies and Shen, 2010).  
As in many other jurisdictions, Chinese policy and law focus on the establishment of a 
network of appropriate institutions that can deal with the restorative, rehabilitative and 
punitive elements of overall policy. As we have seen, however, there is a strong emphasis on 
rehabilitation through education, the use of informal mechanisms and the crucial role of the 
whole society as the initial means to reintegrate young people before legal and punitive 
sanctions are brought into play. In the West, for instance England and Wales, over the past 
two centuries we have witnessed major policy shifts between welfarist, punitive, restorative 
and, latterly, ‘risk management’ models of justice (see Muncie et al, 2002). These have often 
been applied in an inconsistent and socially divisive manner even though the role of 
rehabilitation and education in youth crime control continues to be emphasised (Stephenson, 
2006). The principal difference is that in China the shifts of emphasis tend to occur in 
practice as a pragmatic response to shifting trends in crime in a context of political and 
cultural consensus, whilst in the West they have shifted to meet the needs of various political 
parties that were until recently characterised by distinct ideological differences. However, 
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since the 1990s, Western politics converged around the ‘scramble for the centre ground’ in a 
post-ideological context characterised by the dominance of neoliberalism (Winlow and Hall, 
2012), which also accurately describes the Chinese economy even though it remains under 
central political control. Despite its governmental and cultural differences, China now shares 
a neoliberal socioeconomic model with the West. In this shared context the youth crime 
problem has intensified and juvenile justice appears ever more difficult and fragmentary: 
neither welfare nor justice but a complex and contradictory amalgam (Muncie and Goldson, 
2006). The new risk management orthodoxy in the West represents a move towards a 
pragmatic approach that has always played an important role in the modern Chinese system, 
and it could be said that today both systems are struggling to maintain in practice their better 
formal principles of education, reintegration, welfare and humanitarianism.  
Whichever policy is in fashion, and no matter which ideology is behind dominant 
criminal justice models, youth justice systems in China and the West always face the 
common problem concerning the proportion of rehabilitation and incarceration to be used in 
the response to crime, and the need to balance decisions based on humanitarian grounds with 
the accompanying imperative of protecting the public from harm. In the sphere of education, 
rehabilitation and restoration the distinction between informal and formal measures is also 
important. The most notable aspect of youth justice in Western countries is the agreement 
that there should be some form of separation in the treatment of youth and adult offenders 
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(Doob and Tonry, 2004). China shares with the West the fact that informal measures distinct 
from those deployed in the adult system are readily available for young offenders. In both 
parts of the world there has always been tension among the basic principles and aims that 
constitute the delivery of justice to different age-groups. The difficulty experienced in 
attempting to evaluate the success of various policies, models and projects is also a common 
issue because China shares the same problems facing other countries in criminal justice 
research, such as the lack of accurate data and evidence available to estimate both the true 
level of youth crime and the effectiveness of the measures that attempt to tackle it.  
This article acknowledges the trap of Orientalism (see Said, 2003) and recognises the 
diversity of the impact of transnational practices on human relationships in different 
geographical contexts (see Sheptycki, 2005; Aas, 2007). However, it also undercuts overly 
pluralist arguments based on essentialist cultural differences by emphasising in detail and in 
principle the commonalities that exist in socioeconomic conditions and the spheres of youth 
crime and youth justice when one compares China to many other countries in the West. To 
clarify and sum up, the principal claims we make are twofold.  
Firstly, statistical trends suggest that, in the formal categories and patterns of youth 
offending and the development of youth justice, many similarities exist between China and, 
using the example of England and Wales, other modern industrial societies that have 
undergone and are undergoing profound socioeconomic change. Sometimes it is too easily 
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assumed that societies with cultural and political settings distinct from our own must also 
have profoundly differentiated forms of criminality and official responses to crime. This 
article suggests that this is not always the case, especially during periods of abrupt 
socioeconomic disruption and change. The common issues we have identified may also be 
associated with similarities in internal cultural and legal development, the influences of 
international conventions or just common values derived from the human need to care for 
children and the difficulties societies experience as they attempt to put them into practice in 
unstable circumstances.  
Secondly, this article identifies the challenges facing China today as it tries to 
understand and tackle its youth offending. At the end of this study, and despite what it has 
revealed, there are certainly many more questions that demand answers. For example, are we 
really sure about the fundamental conditions and causes of youth crime in any given society? 
How can we discover and analyse forms of crime, assess their actual harm and measure or at 
least estimate the overall level of youth offending? How can the effectiveness of formal or 
informal measures be evaluated with more precision? While youth offending may affect the 
youth justice system (Doob and Tonry, 2004), does the youth justice system have an impact 
on youth offending? All of these questions and more demand further research and, once 
better quantitative and qualitative data are generated, the extension of sophisticated 
criminological theorisation beyond current orthodox Western frameworks (see Hall and 
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Winlow, 2012). Until more sophisticated theoretical frameworks are constructed and more 
detailed further research begins to yield more reliable findings to bring what we have 
discussed here into sharper relief, all prior assumptions should be suspended.  
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